It was a routine charter flight that ended in catastrophe. On the morning of January 27, 2026, a small aircraft carrying Maharashtra Deputy Chief Minister Ajit Pawar and four others crashed while attempting to land at Baramati airstrip in Pune district. All aboard perished instantly.
Initial reports pointed to poor weather—but deeper investigation reveals a systemic failure: Baramati airstrip had no real-time weather monitoring from the India Meteorological Department (IMD), and visibility was well below the minimum required for safe landing. This wasn’t just bad luck. It was a preventable tragedy rooted in regulatory gaps and oversight failures in India’s rapidly expanding regional aviation network.
The Ajit Pawar plane crash has now ignited a national debate: Are India’s smaller airstrips—many promoted under the UDAN scheme—truly safe for regular operations, especially in adverse conditions?
Table of Contents
- What Happened on January 27?
- Baramati Airstrip and the Missing IMD Link
- Landing Visibility Norms: Were They Ignored?
- Gaps in Chartered Flight Weather Briefings
- How Many Indian Airstrips Lack IMD Support?
- Urgent Calls for Aviation Safety Reform
- Conclusion
- Sources
What Happened on January 27?
According to preliminary findings from the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB), the Cessna 208B Grand Caravan departed from Mumbai’s Juhu aerodrome around 8:15 AM, en route to Baramati—a private airstrip owned by the Pawar family and used frequently for political and personal travel.
As the aircraft approached Baramati around 9:00 AM, dense fog and low clouds blanketed the region. Witnesses reported near-zero visibility. The pilot attempted a landing but lost control during final descent, crashing just short of the runway. There were no survivors [[1]].
Critically, the flight was operating under Visual Flight Rules (VFR)—meaning the pilot relied entirely on seeing the ground to land. But with visibility reportedly below 800 meters, VFR conditions were not met.
Baramati Airstrip and the Missing IMD Link
Here’s the alarming part: Baramati is not an IMD-monitored aerodrome. Unlike major airports such as Delhi or Mumbai, which receive live, automated weather updates every 30 minutes, Baramati has no official meteorological station.
Pilots flying into such airstrips must rely on:
- General area forecasts (not site-specific)
- Visual observation from the cockpit
- Informal updates from local contacts
“This is a known vulnerability,” says a retired DGCA official who spoke on condition of anonymity. “Many private and UDAN airstrips operate without real-time weather data. In winter fog or monsoon rain, that’s playing Russian roulette.”
Landing Visibility Norms: Were They Ignored?
For a VFR landing at a non-towered airstrip like Baramati, the minimum horizontal visibility required is typically 5 kilometers (approx. 3 miles). However, multiple ground sources confirm visibility that morning was between 400–800 meters—far below safe limits [[2]].
So why did the flight proceed? Experts suspect inadequate pre-flight weather briefing. Charter operators are not always mandated to use professional flight planning services, and pilots may underestimate local conditions—especially if they’re familiar with the route.
This raises serious questions about oversight. As aviation analyst Sanjay Simha notes, “Familiarity breeds complacency. Just because you’ve landed at Baramati 50 times doesn’t mean it’s safe on day 51 when fog rolls in.”
Gaps in Chartered Flight Weather Briefings
Unlike scheduled commercial airlines—which use sophisticated meteorological briefings from the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) and Airports Authority of India (AAI)—private charter flights often operate in a gray zone.
Key issues include:
- No mandatory real-time weather check for VFR flights to non-IMD airstrips.
- Lack of automated weather stations (AWS) at over 60% of UDAN and private airstrips.
- Inconsistent enforcement of minimum visibility rules by operators.
The result? A patchwork system where safety depends more on individual pilot judgment than institutional safeguards.
How Many Indian Airstrips Lack IMD Support?
Of India’s 140+ operational airports and airstrips, only about 50 have dedicated IMD or AAI meteorological units. The rest—including most UDAN-subsidized regional airports—rely on nearby city forecasts or manual observations [[3]].
For example:
- Kalaburagi (Karnataka): No AWS; uses Hyderabad forecast (200 km away).
- Darbhanga (Bihar): Recently installed AWS after repeated fog-related delays.
- Baramati (Maharashtra): Zero official weather instrumentation.
This gap is especially dangerous in regions prone to sudden weather changes—like western Maharashtra in winter. You can read more about India’s regional aviation challenges in our analysis [INTERNAL_LINK:udan-scheme-safety-concerns].
Urgent Calls for Aviation Safety Reform
In the wake of the Ajit Pawar plane crash, aviation experts and opposition leaders are demanding immediate reforms:
- Mandate Automated Weather Stations at all airstrips handling regular traffic.
- Require professional meteorological briefings for all charter flights, regardless of size.
- Restrict VFR operations during known high-risk periods (e.g., winter mornings).
- Review the classification of private airstrips used for public figures.
The DGCA has announced a special audit of all non-IMD aerodromes—a step in the right direction, but critics say it’s decades overdue.
Conclusion
The Ajit Pawar plane crash is more than a personal tragedy—it’s a stark warning about the hidden risks in India’s aviation expansion. Promoting regional connectivity is noble, but not at the cost of basic safety infrastructure. If visibility was too low and weather data unavailable, the flight should never have been cleared to land. Fixing this isn’t about bureaucracy; it’s about ensuring no family suffers a similar loss due to preventable oversights.